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1Abstract
For the problem of adjudicating con°icting claims, we consider
the requirement that each agent should receive at least 1=n his claim
truncated at the amount to divide, where n is the number of claimants
(Moreno-Ternero and Villar, 2004a). We identify two families of rules
satisfying this bound. We then formulate the requirement that for
each problem, the awards vector should be obtainable in two equiv-
alent ways, (i) directly or (ii) in two steps, ¯rst assigning to each
claimant his lower bound and then applying the rule to the appropri-
ately revised problem. We show that there is only one rule satisfying
this requirement. We name it the \recursive rule", as it is obtained
by a recursion. We then undertake a systematic investigation of the
properties of the rule.
JEL classi¯cation numbers: C79-D63-D74.
Key-words: claims problems, recursive rule.
21 Introduction
When a group of agents have claims over a resource that add up to more than
is available, how should the resource be divided? A \rule" selects for each
situation of this kind a division among the claimants of what is available.
Much of the literature devoted to the study of rules has been axiomatic.1
A variety of tests of good behavior of rules have been formulated and the
existence of rules passing these tests, singly and in various combinations,
investigated. Among them are tests designed to guarantee agents certain
minimal amounts. A recent suggestion along these lines is that each agent
should receive at least the minimum of (i) his claim divided by the number of
claimants and (ii) the amount available divided by the number of claimants
(Moreno-Ternero and Villar, henceforth MTV, 2004a). This requirement is
not very demanding, being satis¯ed by many of the rules that have been
central in the literature. Yet, when combined with a dual lower bound on
the losses agents incur, and the requirement of consistency, which expresses
a form of robustness of the choice with respect to variations of populations,
only one rule remains admissible, the so-called Talmud rule (again, see MTV,
2004a).
This lower bound on awards is our point of departure. We ¯rst identify
two ways of ¯nding out whether a rule respects it. These results cover all
examples previously known to do so, and in¯nitely many others.
Next, we formulate the following invariance requirement on a rule: for
each problem, suppose that we ¯rst award the lower bounds, revise claims
down accordingly, and apply the rule to divide what remains; the requirement
is that the resulting awards vector should be the same as when the rule is
applied directly to the problem. We show that there is a unique rule satisfying
it. As the rule is de¯ned by means of a recursion, we call it the \recursive
rule".
We then undertake a systematic evaluation of the rule. We ¯rst establish
a number of basic properties it satis¯es. We then show that it is well behaved
from the viewpoint of monotonicity. In particular, when the amount available
increases, all agents receive at least as much as they did initially. Moreover,
when an agent's claim increases, he receives at least as much as he did ini-
tially, and each of the others receives at most as much as he did initially.
1For surveys, see Herrero and Villar (2001), Moulin (2002), and Thomson (2003a,
2003b).
1Next, we show that the rule is invariant under truncation of claims at the
amount to divide. We ¯nally turn to the behavior of the rule in the context
of variable populations. One central property here is replication invariance.
The rule violates this property, but asymptotically, as the order of replica-
tion increases, there is a sense in which it behaves \like" the proportional
rule, as we show next. Also, it fails the consistency requirement alluded to in
the opening paragraph of this introduction. So we ask whether there is any
consistent rule that coincides with it in the two-claimant case. Consistency
has indeed provided a very useful means of extending, to general popula-
tions, rules chosen in the conceptually and mathematically more transparent
two-claimant case. Here, the answer is unfortunately negative. Although
the bound itself is compatible with consistency since many consistent rules
satisfy it, pursuing its logic recursively is not.
2 The model of adjudication of con°icting
claims
There is a set N of claimants having claims over a resource, the amount
of the resource available being insu±cient to honor all of these claims. For
each i 2 N, let ci denote agent i's claim and E the amount to divide. A
claims problem, or simply a problem, is a pair (c;E) 2 RN
+ £ R+ such
that
P
N ci ¸ E.2 Let CN denote the domain of all problems. A division
rule, or simply a rule, is a function de¯ned on CN, which associates with each
(c;E) 2 CN a vector x 2 RN
+. This vector should satisfy the non-negativity
and claims boundedness inequalities 0 5 x 5 c, and its coordinates should
add up to E, a condition to which we refer as e±ciency. Any such vector is
an awards vector for (c;E). Let X(c;E) denote the set of these vectors.
Let S be our generic notation for rules. For each c 2 RN
+, the locus of the
awards vector a rule selects as the amount to divide varies from 0 to
P
ci is
its path of awards for c.
In the variable-population version of the model, there is an in¯nite popu-
lation of \potential" claimants indexed by the natural numbers, N. However,
at any given time, only a ¯nite number of them are present. Let N be the
class of ¯nite subsets of N. A claims problem is de¯ned by ¯rst specifying
2By the notation RN we mean the Cartesian product of jNj copies of R indexed by the
members of N. Vector inequalities: x = y, x ¸ y, and x > y.
2some population N 2 N, and then (c;E) 2 CN. A rule is a function de¯ned
on
S
N2N CN, which associates with each N 2 N and each (c;E) 2 CN an
awards vector of (c;E).
The segment connecting a and b is denoted seg[a;b] and the broken seg-
ment connecting a;b;:::;f is denoted bro:seg[a;b;:::;f]. Given a and b such
that a 5 b, the set of vectors x such that a 5 x 5 b is denoted box[a;b]. The
interval [a;b[½ R contains a but not b.
3 A lower bound on awards
The axiomatic study of any class of problems usually includes lower or upper
bound requirements on assignments, welfares, or utilities. These require-
ments are motivated by fairness, participation, or incentive considerations,
the desire to restrict inequalities in incomes or the range of welfare levels
agent reach, and often by combinations of the above. In the context of the
present model, several requirements of this type have been proposed, and
our starting point is one such requirement: for each problem in CN, each
agent should receive at least 1
jNj of his claim if his claim is at most as large
as the amount to divide, and 1
jNj of the amount to divide otherwise (MTV,
2004a).3 This lower bound on an agent's award is nothing other than 1
jNj of
his claim truncated at the amount to divide. The idea of truncating claims
in this manner is central in the literature. It underlies the de¯nition of sev-
eral rules (Aumann and Maschler, 1985), and the property of a rule that it
be invariant with respect to truncation appears in a number of axiomatic
characterizations of well-known rules (Dagan, 1996; Hokari and Thomson,
2003).
Also, if a rule \corresponds" to a solution de¯ned on a domain of coali-
tional games, it satis¯es this invariance requirement (Curiel, Maschler, and
Tijs, 1987).4
For a formal statement, for each i 2 N, let ti(c;E) ´ minfci;Eg,
t(c;E) ´ (ti(c;E))i2N, and ¹(c;E) ´ 1
jNjt(c;E).
3They refer to it as \securement". A further analysis is in Moreno-Ternero and Villar
(2004b).
4A rule corresponds to a solution for coalitional games if for each problem, the awards
vector it recommends is also the payo® vector obtained by ¯rst converting the problem
into a coalitional game, and then applying the solution to the game.
3Reasonable lower bounds on awards: For each (c;E) 2 CN, S(c;E) =
¹(c;E).
In classical models, agents' individual endowments are often used in the
de¯nition of lower bounds, underlying the commonly imposed condition of
\individual rationality". In the theory of fairness, equal division is used
instead. Reference hypothetical situations in which all agents have the char-
acteristics of a particular agent (his endowment, his preferences, his pro-
ductivity) have also provided the basis for lower bounds and upper bounds
(depending upon whether goods are private or public). One can imagine
basing the bound(s) imposed on an agent's welfare on the characteristics of
all agents, or basing them on his own characteristics and on the collective
variable. Here, individual characteristics are not endowments, but claims.
An agent's claim is already used in the de¯nition of a rule as an upper bound
on what he should receive. We are now proposing to use his truncated claim
as the basis for a lower bound: the bound is a pre-speci¯ed proportion, the
inverse of the number of agents, of his claim. One could think of using as
lower bound a pre-speci¯ed proportion of his claim itself, but that is not a
meaningful option. Indeed, the bounds so obtained are compatible for all
values of the parameters of the problem only if that proportion is 0, but
then all rules qualify. Using truncated claims is a natural and meaningful
alternative, and in fact, the proportion we choose is the highest that pre-
serves compatibility. Consider for example a problem in which all claims are
equal to the amount to divide. Then all truncated claims are equal to that
amount, and the requirement that each agent should receive a proportion
® of his truncated claim, when imposed on each agent, can be met only if
® · 1
jNj.
Let N ´ f1;2g, and c 2 RN
+ with c1 · c2. Let E · c1. Then, if S
satis¯es reasonable lower bounds on awards, and since awarding each agent
at least half of the amount to divide is possible only at equal division, its




2 )]. The view is widely held that
if the amount to divide is small in relation to claims, equal division should




2 );c] whose boundary
is de¯ned by the 45± line and the horizontal line of ordinate
c2
2 . There are
two cases depending upon whether or not c1 ·
c2
2 . They are illustrated in
5Carmen Bevia (oral communication) reported to us that, once presented to the subject
in class, her undergraduates have often spontaneously expressed it. It would be interesting


































Figure 1: Guaranteeing a minimal amount to each claimant. This ¯gure
illustrates reasonable lower bounds on awards for N ´ f1;2g and c 2 RN
+ with
c1 < c2. A rule satis¯es the requirement if its path of awards for c lies in the region




and the shaded area. (a) Here, c1 < c2
2 and the constraint x2 ¸ c2
2 is binding for no
amount to divide. (b) Here, c1 > c2
2 . (c) The path of the constrained equal awards
rule is bro:seg[(0;0);b;c], that of the Talmud rule is bro:seg[(0;0);a;d;c], that of
Pineles' rule is bro:seg[(0;0);a; c
2;e;c], and that of the constrained egalitarian rule
is bro:seg[(0;0);a; c
2;f;b;c]. All of these rules satisfy reasonable lower bounds on
awards for arbitrarily many claimants.
Figure 1. If c1 ·
c2
2 , the constraint that agent 2 should get at least half of
his claim is binding for no amount to divide, in the sense that if an awards
vector x satis¯es the bound for claimant 1, then x2 ¸
c2
2 whenever c2 · E
(Figure 1a). If c1 >
c2
2 , it is binding over the non-empty interval ]c2;2c1[ of
amounts to divide (Figure 1b).
A number of important rules satisfy reasonable lower bounds on awards.
Here are the primary ones. Let (c;E) 2 N. The constrained equal
awards rule selects x 2 X(c;E) such that for some ¸ 2 R+, x =
(minfci;¸g)i2N (O'Neill, 1982; the rule also appears in Maimonides).
Piniles' rule (Piniles, 1861) selects x 2 X(c;E) such that for some ¸ 2 R+,
x = (minf
ci
2 ;¸g)i2N if E ·
P




The Talmud rule (Aumann and Maschler, 1985) selects x 2 X(c;E)
such that for some ¸ 2 R+, x = (minf
ci







2 ¡ ¸;0g)i2N otherwise. De¯ne the minimal right of
claimant i in (c;E) as the di®erence between E and the sum of the
claims of the other agents, or 0 if this di®erence is negative: mi(c;E) ´
maxfE ¡
P






6This quantity, generalized to groups of claimants, underlies O'Neill's proposal to asso-
ciate with each problem a coalitional form game, providing the ground for the application
of the solution concepts developed in that theory to solve claims problem
5and Tijs, 1987). All of these rules pass the test (MTV, 2004a).
Others do too. One is the random arrival rule (O'Neill, 1982), which
selects the average of the awards vectors obtained by imagining claimants
arriving one at a time and fully compensating them until money runs out,
under the assumption that all orders of arrival are equally likely. Indeed, since
the proportion of orders in which a given claimant is ¯rst is 1
jNj, and that for
each such order, he is either fully compensated or receives the entire amount
available, a lower bound on his award is the quantity speci¯ed by reasonable
lower bounds on awards. The minimal overlap rule (O'Neill, 1982) and
the constrained egalitarian rule (Chun, Schummer, and Thomson, 2001)
also satisfy reasonable lower bounds on awards.7 Since the only major rules
in the literature that violate the property are the proportional rule, which
selects x 2 X(c;E) such that for some ¸ 2 R+, x = ¸c, and the constrained
equal losses rule, which selects x 2 X(c;E) such that for some ¸ 2 R+,
x = (maxfci¡¸;0g)i2N, one can say that the property is not very restrictive.
The lower bounds it places on awards are indeed \reasonable".
Next, we present two general ways of identifying rules satisfying reason-
able lower bounds on awards.
² First, consider the following variable-population invariance requirement.
Let N 2 N, (c;E) 2 CN, and x ´ S(c;E). Now, imagine some claimants
leaving with their awards (their components of x), and reassess the situation
at that point. The requirement is that in the revised problem faced by the
remaining claimants, the rule should attribute to each of them the same
amount as initially. (A survey of the various applications that have been
made of the consistency principle is Thomson, 2003c.)
Consistency: For each N 2 N, each (c;E) 2 CN, and each N0 ½ N, if
x ´ S(c;E), then xN0 = S(cN0;
P
N0 xi).
Certain properties of a rule, if satis¯ed in the two-claimant case, are
automatically satis¯ed for more than two claimants if the rule is consistent.
We say that these properties are \lifted" by consistency (this expression
is proposed by Hokari and Thomson, 2003b). Our ¯rst lemma states that
\lifting" occurs for the property that interests us here:
Lemma 1 Reasonable lower bounds on awards is lifted from the two-
claimant case to the general case by consistency.
7We omit the proof for these rules, as their de¯nitions are more involved.
6Proof: Let N 2 N, (c;E) 2 CN, and x ´ S(c;E). Suppose by contradiction,
that there is i 2 N such that xi < 1
jNj minfci;Eg, which implies that (i) xi <
ci
2 . By e±ciency, there is j 2 N such that xj > 1
jNjE, and thus (ii) xi <
xi+xj
2 .
Let N0 ´ fi;jg, and consider the problem (ci;cj;xi + xj). By consistency,
(xi;xj) = S(ci;cj;xi + xj). Since S satis¯es reasonable lower bounds on
awards in the two-claimant case, xi ¸ 1
2 minfci;xi+xjg. This is incompatible
with (i) and (ii). ¤
The constrained equal awards, Talmud, Piniles', and constrained egali-
tarian rules all satisfy reasonable lower bounds on awards in the two-claimant
case: Figure 1c shows that their paths of awards indeed lie in the required
region. Also, they are consistent (see Aumann and Maschler, 1985; Chun,
Schummer and Thomson, 2001). It then follows from Lemma 1 that they
satisfy reasonable lower bounds on awards in general.
For an interesting family of rules, one can say more. First, a rule has a
parametric representation if there are [a;b] ½ R and a continuous and
nowhere decreasing function f : [a;b] £ R ! R such that for each (c;E) 2
CN, it selects x 2 X(c;E) such that for some ¸ 2 [a;b], x = (f(ci;¸))i2N.
(The class is characterized by Young, 1987, on the basis of continuity,
the requirement that small changes in problems should not be accompanied
by large changes in the recommended awards vector, equal treatment of
equals, the requirement that claimants with equal claims should receive
equal amounts, and consistency). We will consider the generalization of
this notion obtained by allowing the function f to depend on claimants, as
follows: there are [a;b] ½ R, and for each i 2 N, a continuous and nowhere
decreasing function fi: [a;b] ! R such that for each (c;E) 2 CN, the rule
selects x 2 X(c;E) such that for some ¸ 2 [a;b], x = (fi(ci;¸))i2N. We refer
to such a rule as \generalized parametric". The following straightforward
lemma tells us when a rule of this type satis¯es the reasonable lower bounds
on awards.
Lemma 2 Let S be a generalized parametric rule of representation
(fi)i2N : [a;b] £ R ! R, where [a;b] ½ R. Then, S satis¯es reasonable
lower bounds on awards if (¤) for each i 2 N, the upper envelope Ci of the
schedules ffi(ci;:)gci2R+ is well-de¯ned and independent of i, and (¤¤) for
each i 2 N and each ci 2 R+, the schedule fi(ci;:) follows Ci from (a;0) up
to a point of ordinate at least
ci
2 .
7Proof: Let (c;E) 2 CN and ¸ 2 [a;b] be such that
P
fi(ci;¸) = E. Then,
for each i 2 N, xi = fi(ci;¸). Now, for each i 2 N, either xi = fi(ci;¸) <




jNj, or fi(ci;¸) = maxj2N xj, in
which case, xi ¸ E
jNj. Thus, the reasonable lower bounds on awards is met.
¤
Since the constrained equal awards, Talmud, Piniles', and constrained
egalitarian rules are parametric rules whose representations all meet require-
ment (¤), they satisfy reasonable lower bounds on awards.
² A second way of identifying rules that satisfy reasonable lower bounds on
awards is obtained by exploiting the notion of an \operator" on the space of
rules, that is, a mapping from the space of rules into itself. Given any rule S,
consider the rule Sm that selects for each problem the awards vector obtained
by ¯rst assigning to each claimant his minimal right, revising claims down
by these amounts, and then applying S to divide the remainder: formally,
for each (c;E) 2 CN, Sm(c;E) ´ m(c;E) + S(c ¡ m(c;E);E ¡
P
mj(c;E)).
We say that Sm is obtained from S by subjecting it to the attribution of
minimal rights operator. Also, given any rule S, consider the rule St
that associates with each problem (c;E) 2 CN, the awards vector obtained
by ¯rst truncating claims at the amount to divide: St(c;E) ´ S(t(c;E);E).
We call this operator the claims truncation operator. (A systematic
investigation of this operator and others is found in Thomson and Yeh, 2003.)
We now assert that if a rule S satis¯es reasonable lower bounds on awards,
so do Sm and St.
Lemma 3 Reasonable lower bounds on awards is preserved under the attri-
bution of minimal rights operator and by the claims truncation operator.
Proof: We ¯rst consider the attribution of minimal rights operator. We
need to show that Sm(c;E) = 1
jNjt(c;E). Our hypothesis on S implies that
S(c ¡ m(c;E);E ¡
P
mj(c;E)) = 1
jNjt(c ¡ m(c;E);E ¡
P
mj(c;E)). Using
the relation t(c ¡ m(c;E);E ¡
P
mj(c;E)) = t(c;E) ¡ m(c;E) (Thomson
and Yeh, 2003), this inequality can be simpli¯ed to Sm(c;E) = m(c;E) +
1
jNj[t(c;E)¡m(c;E)] = 1
jNjt(c;E). After canceling 1
jNjt(c;E) from both sides,
it further simpli¯es to (1¡ 1
jNj)m(c;E) = 0, which trivially holds since jNj ¸ 1
and m(c;E) = 0.
Next, we consider the claims truncation operator. We have that
St(c;E) ´ S(t(c;E);E) = 1
jNj minft(c;E);Eg = 1
jNj minfc;Eg, where the
8¯rst inequality comes from the fact that S satis¯es reasonable lower bounds
on awards, and the equality follows trivially from the de¯nition of the trun-
cation. ¤
We use the ¯rst part of Lemma 3 to give a very simple proof that the
adjusted proportional rule satis¯es reasonable lower bounds on awards (as es-
tablished directly by MTV, 2004a). Indeed, this rule can be described as the
result of subjecting the proportional rule to the attribution of minimal rights
operator and then to the claims truncation operator. Equivalently, it is ob-
tained by subjecting the proportional rule to these operators in reverse order
(Thomson and Yeh, 2003, show that they commute). Now, we assert that P t
satis¯es reasonable lower bounds on awards. Indeed, to show that P t
i(c;E) =
t(ci;E), we write P t




holds since for each i 2 N, E ¸ t(ci;E) and thus jNjE ¸
P
t(ci;E).
Reasonable lower bounds on awards is de¯ned by focusing on what
claimants receive. By switching attention to the losses they incur, we ob-
tain the requirement that if agent i's claim is at most as large as the de¯cit P
cj ¡ E, he should receive at most ci ¡ 1
jNjci, and otherwise, he should re-
ceive at most ci ¡ 1
jNj(
P
cj ¡ E). The formal statement is as follows (MTV,
2004a):
Reasonable lower bounds on losses: For each (c;E) 2 CN and each




Two rules S and Sd are dual if one of them divides what is available
in the same way as what the other divides what is missing: formally, for
each (c;E) 2 CN, Sd(c;E) ´ c ¡ S(c;
P
ci ¡ E). Also, two properties are
dual if whenever a rule satis¯es one of them, the dual of the rule satis¯es
the other. Reasonable lower bounds on awards and reasonable lower bounds
on losses are dual properties (MTV, 2004a). Thus, two families of rules
satisfying reasonable lower bounds on losses can be identi¯ed by duality from
the families of rules satisfying reasonable lower bounds on awards.8
8Given the geometric interpretation of reasonable lower bounds on awards, it is easy
to see (for a formal proof see MTV, 2004a), that in the two-claimant case, the Talmud
rule is the only rule satisfying both of these properties. Indeed, in the two-claimant case,
for the path of awards of a rule to belong to the admissible area identi¯ed in Figure 1






























Figure 2: Comparing two lower bounds. The loci of the vectors of minimal
rights and the vector of reasonable awards are plotted as a function of the amount
to divide, seven values being indicated explicitly. For each k = 1;:::;7, the for-
mer vector for (c;Ek), m(c;Ek), is labelled \k" whereas the latter, ¹(c;Ek), is
denoted k0.
The reasonable lower bounds on awards should be compared to another
lower bound that has been extensively studied in the literature. We have
already de¯ned the \minimal right" of an agent in a problem. This alternative
bound is the claimant's minimal right (Curiel, Maschler and Tijs, 1987). It is
illustrated in the two-claimant case and compared to reasonable lower bounds
on awards in Figure 2 where the loci of the vectors m(c;E) and ¹(c;E) are
plotted as a function of E. The range of the amount to divide can be divided
into three intervals. For E 2 [0;c1 +
c2
2 ], if an awards vector x satis¯es




2 + c2[, the two




ci], if x = m(c;E), then
x = ¹(c;E).
By contrast to the lower bound appearing in reasonable lower bounds on
as required by the dual property of reasonable lower bounds on losses, it has to be the
path of the Talmud rule. It then follows from the Elevator Lemma (Thomson, 2003c), as
MTV note, that the Talmud rule is the only rule to satisfy the two bounds together with
consistency. This is because the Talmud rule is consistent and conversely consistent. (The
Elevator Lemma asserts that if a consistent rule coincides in the two-claimant case with
a conversely consistent rule, then coincidence occurs in general.)
Note that the random arrival rule is self-dual, and so it too satis¯es reasonable lower
bounds on losses. Since both of these properties are preserved under convex operations,
and the Talmud and adjusted proportional rules also satisfy both, we obtain a whole family
of rules satisfying self-duality, reasonable lower bounds on awards, and reasonable lower
bounds on losses.
10awards, the \minimal right lower bound" just de¯ned on a claimant's award
depends on all components of a problem.
The two bounds di®er signi¯cantly in their implications. Indeed, it is a
consequence of the de¯nition of a rule that it always selects a vector that
weakly dominates the vector of minimal rights, whereas we have seen that
a rule may or may not select an awards vector that dominates the vector of
reasonable awards. Characterizations involving reasonable lower bounds on
awards can be found in Yeh (2003).
4 An invariance requirement on rules
Next, we formulate an invariance requirement on rules based on the rea-
sonable lower bounds: for each problem, the awards vector chosen for it
should be obtainable in either one of the following two ways: directly or in
two steps, ¯rst assigning to each claimant his reasonable lower bound, and
second, dividing the remainder, after having revised claims down by these
amounts.
Reasonable awards ¯rst: For each (c;E) 2 CN,
S(c;E) = ¹(c;E) + S(c ¡ ¹(c;E);E ¡
X
¹i(c;E)):
This requirement is inspired by one based on minimal rights that has
been important in the literature. It says that the awards vector should
be obtainable in two ways: directly or in two steps, ¯rst assigning to each
claimant his minimal right, and second dividing the remainder, after having
revised claims down by these amounts (Curiel, Maschler and Tijs, 1987).
Quite a few rules satisfy this property|let us call it minimal right ¯rst|
the Talmud and random arrival rules being examples, but as we now show,
only one satis¯es reasonable awards ¯rst:
Theorem 1 There is a unique rule satisfying reasonable awards ¯rst.
Proof: Let (c;E) 2 CN. The proof is based on the observation that in
the problem obtained from (c;E) by assigning reasonable awards, reasonable
awards may still be positive, justifying a second round of awards. Once these
second-round awards are made, a third problem is obtained in which once
again, reasonable awards may be positive. So, the process can continue. Let
11(c1;E1) ´ (c;E) and for each k ¸ 2, let (ck;Ek) be the problem obtained at

















Note that no agent's claim ever increases from one step to the next and
that the same statement applies to the amount to divide. Since all claims
and amount to divide are bounded below by 0, they have limits. Let these
limits be denoted ¹ c and ¹ E. We will show that ¹ E = 0. Suppose, by way of
contradiction, that ¹ E > 0. Let k 2 N be such that Ek ¡ ¹ E ·
¹ E
jNj2. Since
(ck;Ek) is a well-de¯ned problem, there is i 2 N such that ck
i ¸ Ek
jNj. At
the (k + 1)-th step, agent i receives 1
jNj minfck
i;Ekg, and since all agents
receive non-negative amounts, the amount to divide decreases by at least
this expression. Thus, Ek+1 < Ek ¡ 1
jNj minfck
i;Ekg < ¹ E, in contradiction
with the de¯nition of ¹ E. ¤


















It follows from Theorem 1 that the unique rule satisfying reasonable
awards ¯rst|the name we choose for it re°ects the construction|can be
de¯ned as follows:






Alternatively, for each (c;E) 2 CN, let (¹ c; ¹ E) ´ limk!1(ck;Ek). Then,
R(c;E) = c ¡ ¹ c.
If all claims are positive, there is k 2 N at which there is nothing left to
divide, and conversely, ¯nite convergence requires that all claims be positive.
9Note that ¹k
i (c;E) depends on the other agents' claims (c¡i) since the resources avail-


























































Figure 3: De¯ning the recursive rule for c 2 RN
+ with N ´ f1;2g and
c2 · 2c1. (a) The ¯rst and second segments of its path of awards are obtained
by letting E vary in [0;c2]. They are seg[(0;0);d1] and seg[d1;e1]. (b) Repeating
the construction when E varies in [c2; c1
2 + c2]. (c) The next two segments are
seg[e1;d2] and seg[d2;e2].
One may wonder why the parallel property of minimal rights ¯rst does
not give us a unique rule. The reason is that for each problem, after minimal
rights are assigned, we obtain a revised problem in which minimal rights are
zero (Thomson, 2003b). Thus, there is no reason to repeat the process, and
the property cannot serve directly as the basis for the de¯nition of a rule.
Incidentally, the order of claims is never reversed by the attribution of
reasonable awards. Let i;j 2 N be such that ci < cj. If E · ci, both claims
decrease by E
jNj. If ci < E · cj, ci is replaced by ~ ci ´ ci ¡
ci
jNj and cj by
~ cj ´ cj ¡ E
jNj, then ~ ci · ~ cj. Thus, in the proof of Theorem 1, we could have
chosen agent i to be the agent with the largest claim.
In the next paragraphs, we give an explicit construction of the recursive
rule. In general, (for jNj = 2 and except if the larger claim is twice the smaller
claim), the path of awards of the rule is the concatenation of an in¯nite
number of segments. A graphical representation is possible for jNj = 2. The
shape of the path of awards depends on the relative values of the claims. We
distinguish two cases:
13Case 1: c2 · 2c1: If E · c1, ¹(c;E) = (E
2 ; E
2 ), so R(c;E) = (E
2 ; E
2 )
(Figure 3a). If c1 < E · c2, ¹(c;E) = (
c1
2 ; E
2 ), and in (c ¡ ¹(c;E);E ¡ P
¹i(c;E)), the amount to divide is no greater than the smaller claim, so






4 ). Note that
as E increases, x moves up along a line of slope 3 (Figure 3a). The point








4 ). If c2 < E, ¹(c;E) = c
2.
At ¯rst, equal division of any amount greater than c2 prevails. The process
described for E · c2 is repeated for E ·
c2
2 since this is the value of agent 2's
revised claim (Figure 3b).
The path that results is as follows: divide box[(0;0);c] into four equal
boxes by drawing a vertical line of abscissa
c1
2 and a horizontal line of ordinate
c2
2 ; divide the northeast box so de¯ned into four equal boxes in a similar way;















so on. Let ¾1 ´ seg[(0;0);d1], ¾2 ´ seg[c
2;d2], ¾3 ´ seg[3c
4 ;d3], and so on.
Let e1 be the intersection of ¾2 with the line of slope 3 emanating from d1,
e2 be the intersection of ¾3 with the line of slope 3 emanating from d2, and
so on. Now, the path for c is bro:seg[(0;0);d1;e1;d2;e2;:::] (Figure 3c).
The equality c2 = 2c1 identi¯es the boundary between Case 1 and Case 2
examined next. Then, e1 = d2, e2 = d3, and so on. The segments of slope 1









2 );c] (Figure 4a).
Case 2: c2 > 2c1: The description of the path for this case is more
complex because the direction of the inequality between agent 2's claim and
the amount to divide may not change until several iterations. The path
begins as in Case 1 with a segment of slope 1, and it continues with segments
of slope 3, slope 7,...2k ¡ 1, and so on, until E
2 =
c2
2 , and c2 is revised down
to
c2
2 instead of to E
2 . We refer to this sequence of steps as Stage 1. The
greater c2 is in relation to c1, the more steps in Stage 1. Stage 2 consists of a
parallel sequence of steps, and the path continues with a sequence of segments
of increasing slopes until once gain, the direction of the inequality between
agent 2's claim and the amount to divide changes. Figure 4b illustrates the
construction for (c;E) such that c2 = 2:5c1 and up to E = 3c1.
5 Properties of the recursive rule
In this section, we undertake a systematic investigation of the properties of





























Figure 4: Path of awards for the recursive rule. (a) The case c1 = c2
2 .
(b) A con¯guration for which c1 < c2
2 . The path consists of parts, each of which
consists of sequences of increasing slopes, starting with a segment of slope 3. For
short, we write ¹k for ¹k(c;E).
15and we refer to Thomson (2003a, 2003b) for complete references.
By de¯nition, the rule satis¯es reasonable lower bounds on awards. It
obviously satis¯es equal treatment of equals. In situations in which some
agents are deemed more deserving than others, this axiom is not desirable
however, but if needed, the rule can be rede¯ned so as to accommodate an
asymmetric treatment of agents with equal claims. One introduces weights
® 2 int¢N re°ecting the extent to which certain agents are thought to be
more deserving than others.10 For each i 2 N, let ¹®
i (c;E) ´ ®iti(c;E). We
now reformulate our lower bound as follows: the ®-weighted reasonable
lower bound is S(c;E) = (®iti(c;E))i2N. The ®-weighted bound is satis¯ed
by the weighted constrained equal awards rule with weights ® and by the
weighted versions of the Talmud rule with weights ® (Hokari and Thomson,
2003a). However, the requirement S(c;E) = ¹®(c;E) + S(c ¡ ¹®(c;E);E ¡ P
¹®
i (c;E)) is met by only one rule, which is a weighted version of the
recursive rule. We omit the proof, which follows that of Theorem 1.
The recursive rule satis¯es order preservation (Aumann and Maschler,
1985), the requirement that awards should be ordered as claims are, and that
so should losses. The proof relies on the fact that at each step of the recursion,
awards are ordered as claims are, as shown above, and that, after revision,
the order of claims is not reversed. Similarly, losses are ordered as claims are.
Indeed, note that if ci · cj, then ci ¡ 1
jNj minfci;Eg · cj ¡ 1
jNj minfci;Eg, as
can be seen by examining the three possible cases, E · ci, ci < E · cj, and
cj < E.
The rule satis¯es anonymity, the requirement that the names of agents
should not matter, and homogeneity, the requirement that, starting from
any problem, if the data of the problem are multiplied by some positive
number, so should the recommended awards vector.
We now turn to two basic monotonicity properties. First is the require-
ment that when the amount available increases, each agent should receive at
least as much as he did initially. The idea of monotonicity is central to the
axiomatic literature on fair allocation (for a survey, see Thomson, 2003d).
Resource monotonicity: For each (c;E) 2 CN and each E0 > E, if
P
ci ¸
E0, then S(c;E0) = S(c;E).
The following lemma relates the sequences of revised problems obtained
for two values of the amount available.
10The notation ¢N designates the simplex in RN.
16Lemma 4 For each (c;E) 2 CN and each E0 > E such that (c;E0) 2 CN, let
(ck;Ek) and (c0k;E0k) be the revised problems of the k-th step, starting from
(c;E) and (c;E0) respectively. Then, for each k > 1, c0k 5 ck and E0k ¸ Ek.
We relegate the proof to the appendix.
Proposition 1 The recursive rule is resource monotonic.
Proof: Let (c;E) 2 CN, and E0 > E be such that (c;E0) 2 CN. Let i 2 N.




Then, ¹ ci ´ limk!1 ci
k ¸ limk!1 c0
i
k ´ ¹ c0
i. By de¯nition of the recursive rule,
Ri(c;E0) ´ ci ¡ ¹ c0
i ¸ ci ¡ ¹ ci ´ Ri(c;E). ¤
Many models include the speci¯cation of individual parameters, repre-
senting initial ownership of assets, rights, obligations, and so on. Whenever
these parameters are valuable resources|as in the case of assets or rights|
it is natural to require that an increase in an individual's parameter should
bene¯t him. If they are not valuable, what is natural to require is that an
increase should penalize him. Here, the parameter falls in the ¯rst category
and we require that if an agent's claim increases, he should receive at least
as much as he did initially.




We may also be interested in how the other agents are a®ected by an
increase in some agent's claim. We require that each of them should receive
at most as much as he did initially.12
Others-oriented claims monotonicity: For each (c;E) 2 CN, each i 2 N,
and each c0
i > ci, we have SNnfig(c0
i;c¡i;E) 5 SNnfig(c;E).
Together with e±ciency, (which is incorporated in the de¯nition of a
rule,) this property implies claims monotonicity. In the two-claimant case,
the two properties are equivalent.
11The notation c¡i designates the vector c from which the i-th coordinate has been
deleted, and the notation (c0
i;c¡i) the vector c in which the i-th coordinate has been
replaced by c0
i.
12Thomson (1987) formulates a parallel for classical exchange economies.
17It will be convenient to ¯rst show that the recursive rule satis¯es others-
oriented claims monotonicity, and deduce that it satis¯es claims monotonic-
ity. We ¯rst prove a lemma which relates the revised problems after each
recursion when an agent's claim increases.
Lemma 5 For each (c;E) 2 CN, each i 2 N, and each c0




¡i;E0k) be the revised problems of the k-th step, starting from (c;E)
and (c0
i;c¡i;E) respectively. Then, for each k > 1, c0k = ck and E0k · Ek.
We relegate the proof to the appendix. It is by induction. We ¯rst show
that for each k > 1, c0k = ck. Then we show that at each step of the recursion,
the set of agents whose claim is smaller than the amount available for the
new problem is a subset of the corresponding set for the original problem.
Using these two facts we conclude that for each k > 1, E0k · Ek.
Our next result is an immediate consequence of Lemma 5 and the de¯ni-
tion of the recursive rule.
Proposition 2 The recursive rule is others-oriented claims monotonic.
Proof: Let (c;E) 2 CN, i 2 N, and c0
i > ci. By Lemma 5, for each j 2 Nnfig
and each k > 1, c0
j
k ¸ ck
j. Then, and using the notation of the lemma,
¹ c0
j ´ limk!1 c0
j
k ¸ limk!1 ck
j ´ ¹ cj. By de¯nition of the recursive rule,
Rj(c0
i;c¡i;E) ´ cj ¡ ¹ c0
j · cj ¡ ¹ cj ´ Rj(c;E). ¤
The following proposition is a direct corollary of Proposition 2:
Proposition 3 The recursive rule is claims monotonic.
Next we turn to an important invariance property. Since the part of an
agent's claim that exceeds the amount available cannot be recovered anyway,
we might just as well ignore it: If an agent's claim is truncated at the amount
available, the awards vector should not be a®ected. This property is satis¯ed
by several important rules,13 and as noted earlier, it is necessarily satis¯ed
by a rule that has a counterpart in the theory of coalitional games.14
Invariance under claims truncation: For each (c;E) 2 CN, we have
S(c;E) = S(t(c;E);E).
13See Aumann and Maschler (1985) and Dagan and Volij (1993).
14This is proved by Curiel, Maschler and Tijs (1987).
18The proof of the next proposition is relegated to the appendix.
Proposition 4 The recursive rule is claims truncation invariant.
The recursive rule violates reasonable lower bounds on losses, self-
duality (Aumann and Maschler, 1985; the requirement that the rule should
coincide with its dual), and composition down (Moulin, 2000), which says
that if the amount to divide decreases from some initial value, the awards vec-
tor should be obtainable directly, or by using as claims vector the awards vec-
tor calculated for the initial amount, and composition up (Young, 1987),
which is an invariance property pertaining to the opposite possibility. It vi-
olates minimal rights ¯rst. To see this, let N ´ f1;2g and (c;E) 2 CN be
given by (c;E) = (3;6;4). Since c2 = 2c1 and E > c1, R(c;E) is the point




2 );c] = seg[(1:5;1:5);(3;6)] with the budget line.
Thus, Ri(c;E) > 1:5. On the other hand, m(c;E) = (0;1) and the revised
problem is (3;5;3). The amount to divide is equal to the smallest claim
and we obtain equal division in the second step, namely (1:5;1:5). Thus,
R1(c;E) > 1:5 = 0 + 1:5 = m1(c;E) + R1(c ¡ m(c;E);E ¡
P
mi(c;E)).
We continue with variable-population properties. First, the recursive rule
violates replication invariance, the requirement that for each problem,
the awards vector chosen for a replica of it should be the corresponding
replica of the awards vector chosen for the initial problem. This can be
seen as follows: let N ´ f1;2g and (c;E) 2 CN be such (c;E) = (2;4;2).
Then, ¹(c;E) = (1;1) and R(c;E) = (1;1). We replicate this problem once,
denoting by 2¤(c;E) the resulting problem and 2¤R(c;E) the corresponding
replica of R(c;E). We have ¹(2 ¤ (c;E)) = ¹(2;4;2;4;4) = (:5;1;:5;1), and
¹(c¡¹(c;E)) = ¹(1:5;3;1:5;3;1) = (:25;:25;:25;:25), so that R(2¤(c;E)) =
(:75;1:25;:75;1:25) 6= 2 ¤ R(c;E), in violation of replication invariance.
Let r 2 N denote the order of replication. When a problem (c;E) 2 CN
is replicated r times, let r ¤ N be the population in the replica problem,
and r ¤ (c;E) the replica problem. In an r-replica of (c;E), we are led to
calculating the minimum of ci and rE, which for r large enough, is the
former quantity. Then, proportional division is the outcome. Note that for
each c 2 RN
+ and each r 2 N, the path of the recursive rule for cr¤N starts
with equal division.
Let N 2 N and (c;E) 2 CN. When a rule satis¯es equal treatment of
equals, in an r-replica of (c;E), all clones of each member of N receive equal
amounts, so the awards vector the rule selects is the r-replica of some awards
19vector xr of (c;E). To say that the rule is replication invariant is to say
that xr is independent of r. If it is not replication invariant, it is natural to
enquire whether the sequence fxrg of awards vectors so de¯ned has a limit,
and if yes, to identify the rule de¯ned by associating to each problem this
limit. Questions of this type are addressed by Chun and Thomson (2003) who
obtain certain rules as limits of two rules that violate replication invariance.15
Here, we have convergence too, and interestingly, the rule towards which
convergence occurs is the proportional rule.
Theorem 2 The awards vector selected by the recursive rule for a replica
problem is the replica of an awards vector of the problem that is replicated
that, as the order of replication increases, converges to the proportional
awards vector of that problem.
Proof: Let N 2 N and (c;E) 2 CN be given. If E = 0, the answer is
straightforward, so let us assume that E > 0. Let r ¤ (c;E) be obtained by
replicating r-times the problem (c;E). For r large enough, for each i 2 N,







j2N cj = 1
jNj
P
j2N cj.) Revised claims are proportional
to original claims. At the second round, if the amount that remains to
divide is still larger than the largest revised claim, proportional division to
the revised claims prevails. Thus, total awards so far are still proportional
to original claims. This goes on until a stage k(r) at which the amount to
divide is smaller than the largest claim revised k(r) times. This remainder is
divided among rjNj claimants. Each copy of the original population receives
at most
maxcj
rjNj , so the sum of the partial terms received by each member of
each copy is a quantity that goes to zero as r ! 1. ¤
The recursive rule violates consistency. (The ¯rst application to claims
problems of the idea of consistency is due to Young, 1987). We could give
an example to make this point but we will instead derive it as a corollary
of a proposition that addresses the more general question whether the two-
claimant version of the rule has any consistent extension.16
15The random arrival and minimal overlap rules converge to the proportional and con-
strained equal losses rules respectively.
16In fact, the rule violates the weaker property of null claims consistency, the re-
quirement that if an agent's claim is 0, removing him should not a®ect the awards recom-
20The answer is negative. The proof is based on a geometric technique
developed in Thomson (2001). This technique exploits the following simple
geometric implication of consistency of a rule: for each N 2 N, each c 2 RN
+,
and each N0 ½ N, its path for c, when projected onto RN0, is a subset of
its path for cN0. Moreover, if the rule is resource monotonic, this projection
actually coincides with the path for cN0. Resource monotonicity holds here
since the recursive rule satis¯es this property in the two-claimant case, and
this property is lifted (Dagan and Volij, 1997; Hokari and Thomson, 2003b).
So, if the recursive rule had a consistent extension, this extension would
be resource monotonic. The key to this sort of argument is to exploit the
projection implication of consistency for entire paths of awards, not just
point by point, and to understand which properties of paths are preserved
by projections and which are not.
Proposition 5 The two-claimant recursive rule has no bilaterally consistent
extension to general populations.
Proof: Let S be a consistent extension of the two-claimant recursive rule.
Let N ´ f1;2;3g and c 2 RN
+ be de¯ned by c ´ (10;14;20). Let ¦3 be
the path of S for cf1;2g = (10;14) 2 R
f1;2g
+ . Since c2 < 2c1, Case 1 of
the description of the rule given above applies. We will only need the ¯rst
two segments of ¦3. Let ¦2 be the path for cf1;3g = (10;20) 2 R
f1;3g
+ .










2 ) and k2 ´ k1 +
c2¡c1








4 ) be the ¯rst




2 ) be the kink in ¦2, and `2 be the point
of ¦2 whose ¯rst coordinate is equal to k2
















2 )] ½ RN. This segment
is contained in the plane of equation x2 = x3, and its projection onto R
f2;3g
+
mended for the other claimants. To see this, let N ´ f1;2g and (c;E) 2 CN be given by
(c;E) = (2;4;3). Then, ¹(c;E) = (1;1:5) and R(c;E) = (1;1:5)+(:25;:25) = (1:25;1:75).
Now, let N0 ´ f1;2;3g and (c0;E0) 2 CN
0
be given by (c0;E0) = (2;4;0;3). We have
¹(c0;E0) = (:666;1;0); revised claims are (1:33;3;0) and the revised amount to divide
1.33. In the new problem (c00;E00) we have ¹(c00;E00) = 1
3(1:33;1:33;0). From that point
on, the revised claims of agents 1 and 2, once truncated, are equal, so we obtain a sequence
of equal division steps, which when taken to the limit, give us an equal division of 1.33.









2 ) 2 R
f2;3g
+ is the point m1). Since
the slope of the second segment of ¦3 is equal to that of the second segment






4 ´ a. A simple
calculation shows that a = 8. Thus, the point in RN whose projections onto
Rf1;2g and Rf1;3g are k2 and `2 has equal second and third coordinates, and
its projection onto Rf2;3g belongs to the 45± line of that space. Thus, for S
to be consistent, the path for cf2;3g = (14;20) 2 R
f2;3g
+ should also contain
seg[m1;(a;a)]. However, since c3 < 2c2, Case 1 applies to cf2;3g: the path


















2 > c2, the point (a;a) lies above
the line of equation t2 + t3 = c2. We have obtained a contradiction. ¤
6 A comparison with another lower bound
Other bounds have been proposed for rules than the one we studied here. A
simple one is that each agent should receive the minimum of his claim and
equal division (Moulin, 2002). This constrained equal division lower
bound on awards is more restrictive than the reasonable lower bounds on
awards (MTV, 2004a), and in fact, by itself, it characterizes the constrained
equal awards rule in the two-claimant case.
Let us base on it an invariance axiom parallel to the one we based on
reasonable awards: for each problem, the awards vector should be obtainable
in two ways, (i) directly, or (ii) in two steps, by ¯rst assigning to each claimant
his lower bound, and in a second step, assigning to him what the rule would
in the appropriately revised problem.17 It is straightforward to see that this
property, independently of the number of claimants, is satis¯ed only by the
constrained equal awards rule.
The constrained equal division lower bound is the largest anonymous
bound that one can impose on an agent's award that depends only on the
agent's own claim and the amount to divide. To see this, let b(ci;E) be
a bound of this type imposed on claimant i's award in the problem (c;E).
(Anonymity is re°ected in the fact that the function b is independent of i.)
17Let ºi(c;E) ´ minfci; E
jNjg and º(c;E) ´ (ºi(c;E))i2N. Then, x = º(c;E) is the
constrained equal division lower bound and the invariance property is S(c;E) = º(c;E) +

































Figure 5: The two-claimant version of the recursive rule has no consis-
tent extension to general populations. This ¯gure pertains to the claims
vector c ´ (10;14;20). It shows the ¯rst two segments of the path ¦3 of
the recursive rule for cf1;2g = (10;14) 2 R
f1;2g
+ , and its entire path ¦2 for
cf1;3g = (10;20) 2 R
f1;3g
+ . The path for c of a consistent extension of R (this
path is not represented), if such an extension exists, can be constructed from these
projections, ¦2 and ¦3. Its projection onto Rf2;3g contains seg[(0;0);m2].
23By de¯nition of a rule, we need b(ci;E) · ci. Also, for there to exist an
awards vector meeting this bound for each agent, the pro¯le (b(ci;E))i2N
should be such that
P
b(ci;E) · E. Fix i 2 N. If ci > E, in the well-
de¯ned problem (¹ c;E) 2 CN in which for each j 2 N, ¹ cj = ci, we obtain
jNjb(ci;E) · E. Altogether, b(ci;E) · minfci; E
jNjg, as claimed.
The property of a rule that it meets the constrained equal division lower
bound is of course lifted since (i) in the two-claimant case, only one rule
satis¯es it, the two-claimant constrained equal awards rule, and (ii) the con-
strained equal awards rule, the only consistent rule that coincides with its
two-claimant version,18 also satis¯es the bound. On the other hand, the
property is not preserved under the attribution of minimal rights operator.
Indeed, the rule obtained by subjecting the two-claimant constrained equal
awards rule to this operator is the Talmud rule, which does not meet the
bound.
The bound we have considered here is less demanding than the constrained
equal division lower bound, but the invariance axiom based on it also leads
to a unique rule.
7 Appendix
In this appendix we prove Lemmas 4 and 5.
Proof: (of Lemma 4) The proof is by induction.
Step 1 of the induction.
Part 1: c02 5 c2.
Let i 2 N. Using the hypothesis c1
i = c0
i



































































































Part 2: E02 ¸ E2.
Let A ´ fi 2 N : c1
i · E1g and A0 ´ fi 2 N : c0
i
1 · E01g. We claim
that that A0 ¶ A (and therefore, A0C µ AC). Indeed, let i 2 A. Then,
c1
i · E1. Since E1 < E01, then c0
i
1 = c1
i · E1 < E01, which implies i 2 A0.



































































For each i 2 A0 n A, we have c0
i































































Step k of the induction. Let k ¸ 2, and suppose that for each ` 2
f1;:::;k ¡ 1g, we have c0` 5 c` and E0` ¸ E`.
Part 1: c0k 5 ck.






































i ¸ E0k¡1 ¸ c0
i








































i ¸ E0k¡1 ¸ Ek¡1 ¸ c0
i
k¡1, or E0k¡1 ¸ c
k¡1









































































Part 2: E0k ¸ Ek.
Let A ´ fi 2 N : c
k¡1
i · Ek¡1g and A0 ´ fi 2 N : c0
i
k¡1 · E0k¡1g.
We claim that A0 ¶ A (and therefore A0C µ AC). Indeed, let i 2 A. Then,
c
k¡1




i and E0k¡1 ¸ Ek¡1.
Thus, c0
i
k¡1 · E0k¡1, which implies i 2 A0.
























































































































i and E0k¡1 ¸ Ek¡1. Thus,
E0k ¸
n¡jACj







27The proof of Lemma 5 is parallel to that of Lemma 4.
Proof: (of Lemma 5) The proof is by induction. Without loss of generality
suppose that the agent whose claim increases is claimant 1; that is, c0
1 > c1.
Step 1 of the induction.
Part 1: c02 = c2.
For each i 2 f2;:::;ng, we have c1
i = c0
i



















































































































Part 2: E02 · E2.










E01 = E1, and for each i 2 N, c0
i
1 ¸ c1
i, then E02 · E2.
Step k of the induction. Let k ¸ 2 and suppose that for each ` 2
f1;:::;k¡1g, we have c0` = c` and E0` · E`. We need to show that c0k = ck
and E0k · Ek.
28Part 1: c0k = ck.






































k¡1 ¸ Ek¡1 ¸ c
k¡1








































k¡1 ¸ Ek¡1 ¸ E0k¡1 ¸ c
k¡1
i , or Ek¡1 ¸ c0
i











































































Part 2: E0k · Ek. Let A ´ fi 2 N : c
k¡1
i · Ek¡1g and A0 ´ fi 2
N : c0
i
k¡1 · E0k¡1g.19 We claim that A0 µ A (and therefore A
0C ¶ AC).
Indeed, let i 2 A0. Then, c0
i





k¡1 and E0k¡1 · Ek¡1. Thus, c
k¡1
i · Ek¡1, which implies i 2 A0.
Next, by the de¯nitions of A and A0,



































































For each i 2 A n A0, we have c
k¡1








































































To simplify notation, for each k ¸ 2, let us denote the sum of the vectors

































Proof: (of Proposition 4)
Let (c;E) 2 CN and consider (t(c;E);E) 2 CN.
Let i 2 N. By de¯nition, ¹i(c;E) = 1
n minfci;Eg = 1
nti(c;E) =
1
n minfti(c;E);Eg = ¹i(t(c;E);E). Thus,
¹(c;E) = ¹(t(c;E);E): (1)
Claim: For each k 2 N, ¹k(c;E) = ¹k(t(c;E);E).
The proof is by induction. The case k = 1 is covered by (1). Now, let







































Let i 2 N. There are two cases:
31Case 1: ci · E.
















where the second equality is by de¯nition of the dividends. The claim is
proved.
Case 2: ci > E.
Then, ci > ti(c;E) = E, and
ci ¡ M
k
i (t(c;E);E) > ti(c;E) ¡ M
k




























































and this equality, together with (1) and (4), yields ¹k
i(c;E) = ¹k
i(t(c;E);E).
The claim is proved.
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